The Arday affair left one question unanswered by everything written about it. When a man opens somebody’s footnotes and finds that the citation does not support the sentence, is he tracking truth or tracking an enemy? Everyone answered by address. His defenders said scholarship. His opponents said opposition research. Neither side offered evidence, because the only case in front of them was a case where the audit and the animus pointed the same way.
There is a control available.
Richard Lynn (1930–2023) built the national IQ datasets that underlie a large secondary literature. With Tatu Vanhanen he published IQ and the Wealth of Nations in 2002 and IQ and Global Inequality in 2006, and he later worked with David Becker on updated estimates. The datasets assign an average score to each country and correlate those scores with economic performance. Lynn described himself as a scientific racist. Ulster University stripped his emeritus status in 2018 after student protests.
The current status of that work is contested in ways that should be stated before anything else. The European Human Behavior and Evolution Association issued a formal statement in 2020 discouraging use of the datasets and calling them unscientific. A campaign led by Rebecca Sear has been pressing journals to retract articles built on them, and is tracking well over a hundred such studies. Proceedings of the Royal Society B retracted a 2010 paper, “Parasite prevalence and the worldwide distribution of cognitive ability,” in March 2024, saying the underlying between-country IQ data had been criticized for inaccuracies and biases that had not been resolved. Several of Lynn’s own papers carry expressions of concern. On the underlying question of whether genetic differences explain group gaps in test performance, the mainstream scientific position is that they do not.
This is an essay about who is willing to check whose work, and at what cost.
Lynn is a figure whose conclusions are congenial to the people who defended him against the retraction campaign. If criticism of scholarship follows coalition lines, they should have defended the workmanship along with the man. Some did. Several did not, and the ones who did not are the evidence.
Nathan Cofnas is the most consequential of them, because he is the person who later audited Jason Arday (1985–2026).
In 2024, responding to the campaign against Lynn, Cofnas argued in a comment thread under Steve Sailer’s post that the papers should not be retracted, that retraction belongs to fraud, plagiarism, or something equivalent to mathematical error, that the charge of biased practice against Lynn was true and beside the point at issue, and that the targeting was political. Then he turned on his own side. He warned that many hereditarians would feel an impulse to defend Lynn’s work, called that a mistake, and said it was what the campaigners wanted. He described the national IQ work as profoundly flawed and told his readers not to make excuses. He repeated the criticism in 2025, calling Lynn sloppy while maintaining that some of the findings survive. He put it in his own signed writing in January 2026, six months before the Arday post, saying Lynn and Rushton produced profoundly flawed scholarship and often exercised poor judgment about their associations.
Separate the four questions he separated. Was Lynn politically targeted? In his view yes. Should the papers therefore be pulled? No. Was the work bad? Yes. Should his allies defend it because they like the conclusions? No.
That is the distinction which collapsed in the first week of the Arday affair, running in the opposite direction. There, the identity of the accuser was offered as an answer to the accusation. Here, the identity of the accusers is offered as a reason to reject the retraction while conceding the substance of the methodological complaint.
Jason Malloy is the better example, because he did the work rather than stating the principle.
When Malloy launched Human Varieties in 2013 he described himself as a hereditarian who had spent years in that world and had defended James Watson. Then he opened Lynn’s references country by country. The Equatorial Guinea figure was the spectacular one. Lynn and Vanhanen had assigned the country a score drawn from a study of 48 subjects. The subjects had been tested in Spain. The estimate was eventually withdrawn. Working through “HVGIQ: Dominican Republic,” Malloy said the number of errors was disturbing him, found a cited UNESCO source that did not contain what it was said to contain, and questioned the inconsistent handling of achievement data and the omission of an unusually high Cuban result. He was not trying to sink the research program. He wanted a better database and set about building one.
That is the same method Cofnas later applied to Arday’s thesis, performed by a man on Lynn’s own side, thirteen years earlier, at no political profit whatever.
The others fill in a spectrum where a coalition line should be.
Emil Kirkegaard was close to Lynn. Lynn helped place his first paper and invited him to a conference, and his 2023 eulogy treats Lynn as a mentor. His 2019 review of The Intelligence of Nations, “Solid numbers, missed opportunities,” raised measurement invariance, the question of whether the same test measures the same construct across very different populations, and criticized the causal analysis as making little use of the methods that would be needed to establish national-level causation. The eulogy repeats the point. He still thinks the program has been productive.
Heiner Rindermann accepts that cross-national cognitive measures track economic outcomes, and has said that Lynn and Vanhanen’s data had serious problems: unrepresentative samples, tests from different periods requiring Flynn-effect adjustment, missing countries filled by estimate, heterogeneous instruments, the Equatorial Guinea error. He then showed that international school-assessment data produced broadly similar relationships, which separates the workmanship from the hypothesis. He is a party to the retraction fight now rather than an observer of it. Discover Education pulled a 2024 article of his, saying post-publication review found fundamental flaws in using student assessment data as a measure of cognitive ability. He disagrees with the retraction.
David Becker became Lynn’s collaborator and rebuilt the dataset with more standardized procedures, writing openly that earlier estimates contained ambiguities, errors and deviations, correcting further mistakes after publication when outside reviewers found them, and acknowledging the absence of conventional peer review.
Russell Warne’s 2022 assessment argues a middle position: enough validity to justify continued work, alongside substantial weaknesses, with the imputed scores as the worst of them. Where a country had no usable data, a figure was sometimes estimated from its neighbors, and those imputations correspond poorly to later country-specific measurements.
Steve Sailer conceded errors, questionable inclusion decisions and some personal bias, while arguing the broad findings replicate. Crémieux argues that newer datasets validate the estimates and rejects the claim of systematic bias. Noah Carl reviews the dispute and states in the open that some hereditarians count among Lynn’s critics, naming Cofnas.
Behind all of it sits Jelte Wicherts and colleagues, who reviewed the sub-Saharan African literature systematically and argued, in their rejoinder to Lynn and Meisenberg, that Lynn’s inclusion and exclusion decisions were not systematic, that judgments about whether a sample was representative appeared to track the result the sample produced, and that the African estimate was therefore biased downward. Lynn and his collaborators disputed the reading. Carl, who accepts the general research program, has said that this particular criticism is valid.
So the world that produced Cofnas contains a man who audited the founding dataset and found the numbers did not match the sources, a protégé who published the causal weaknesses, a collaborator who rebuilt the file, and a spectrum of defenders running from qualified to unqualified.
What does that add to the Cofnas story?
The claim that Cofnas audits scholarship only when the audit injures political opponents is hard to hold once you have the 2024 and January 2026 material in front of you. He told his own coalition that its canonical figure was unreliable, while that coalition was under attack, at a moment when solidarity was the obvious move. Whatever else he is, he is not a man who has never paid a price inside his own tent.
What it does not answer is larger, and an honest essay has to say so.
His stated rule holds sloppiness outside the retraction threshold and plagiarism inside it. Lynn’s documented problems are selection, imputation, source handling, measurement and causal inference. The central allegation against Arday was copied text. On the face of the rule, the two positions cohere. But consistency of a stated rule and equality of its enforcement are different claims, and only the first has been demonstrated. Nobody has shown that Cofnas would spend three weeks running a right-coded scholar’s thesis through detection software, publish the passages, and press that man’s employer. In the Lynn case he declined to defend the methods while opposing any sanction. In the Arday case he initiated the process that ended in sanction. Both can follow the rule while the effort runs one way.
The matched test is specific and nobody has run it. Find a case where a figure inside or adjacent to hereditarian circles faced a documented allegation of plagiarism or fabrication, and ask what Cofnas and the others did. If no such case exists, that absence is the finding and should be printed as one. And when you assemble the names, fix the list before searching, then report who said nothing about Lynn alongside who spoke. The silences carry as much information as the statements.
What the Lynn file adds to the Arday story is a norm and a proof that the norm is achievable.
The norm is the separation of the claimant from the claim. Kenan Malik restored it in the Observer by saying that Cofnas’s racial views settle nothing about whether the evidence was true. The Lynn material shows the same operation performed by the least likely people, on their own side, years earlier and out of public view. It can be done. People with strong political stakes in a conclusion have looked at the workmanship behind it and said the workmanship was bad. That is a higher standard than most of the commentary on Arday reached in three weeks.
The Lynn file also hands the left an argument it has not used. The strongest version of the case against the Arday coverage is not that Cofnas is a racist and therefore wrong. It is that the intensity of scrutiny, the willingness to sustain it for weeks, and the choice of target were selected by politics even where the individual findings held. That argument survives everything in this essay. It would also survive if every claim against Arday were eventually sustained.
There is one more asymmetry. Malloy audited Lynn’s references and found errors and nothing happened to him. Cofnas told his own coalition its founder was unreliable and nothing happened to him. Cofnas audited Arday and now faces dismissal at Ghent. The difference does not lie in the quality of the audits. It lies in where the subjects sat. Lynn was a marginal figure whose institution had already withdrawn his title. Arday held a chair at Cambridge, a publishing contract, and the protection of a defamation firm that had already stopped one publication from running the story.
The lesson taught by that arrangement is the one to worry about. Check the footnotes of a man the institutions have abandoned and nothing follows. Check the footnotes of a man the institutions are invested in and the consequences arrive, first from his lawyers, then from the police, then from your own employer. Whatever Ghent eventually says about its reasons, that is the pattern a young academic will read off the record.
